Q&A

What is second order volition?

What is second order volition?

second-order volition: a desire that a certain desire be one’s will, i.e., a desire that a certain desire bring one to action.

What is the difference between a first order and second order desire?

A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order desire is a desire for a desire. So, for instance, you might have a first order desire to smoke a cigarette; and a second order desire that you desire not to smoke a cigarette.

What is a first order volition?

A first-order volition is a desire about anything else, such as to own a new car, to meet the pope, or to drink alcohol. Second-order volition are desires about desires, or to desire to change the process, the how, of desiring.

Can a wanton have second order desires?

Consider an agent just like the first in being physiologically and psychologically addicted to a drug. However, unlike the unwilling addict, the wanton addict has no second-order volitions with respect to desires either for or against taking the drug.

What are second-order preferences?

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences.

What are second order preferences?

Is Frankfurt a Compatibilist?

The view that free will is compatible with determinism is called compatibilism. Harry Frankfurt is a prominent defender of a compatibilist view of free will.

What is a wanton philosophy?

How does Frankfurt define a wanton? Definition. It’s someone who doesn’t have second order desires. They don’t want to want anything; they don’t not want to want anything. They just do whatever their strongest desire is and don’t take a stance on anything at all. (

What is a first order preference?

Start by distinguishing between first and second-order preferences. My preference for chocolate over vanilla is a first-order preference. He prefers to get his fix over not getting it, but prefers not to have those preferences—he wants to get his fix, but would rather not want to.